THE DOWNSIDE OF BENIGN INTENT
MARGARET MARTIN BARRY

Statutes in all fifty states and the territories authorize courts to issue civil orders designed to provide protection to survivors of domestic violence and their children.! The District of Columbia statute2
that authorizes this intervention, the Intrafamily Offenses Act,
premises the entry of these orders, called Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) and Civil Protection Orders (CPOs),3 upon the finding
that an intrafamily offense has occurred.4 However, in the Intrafamily and Neglect Branch of the District's Superior Court,5 traditionally those individuals required to respond to petitions for CPOs
have not been required to admit to the alleged crime in order for
the court to enter an order by consent.6 This practice has been so

* The author is an Assistant Professor at Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America, where she teaches in the Families and the Law Clinic. The Clinic represents survivors
of domestic violence in obtaining protective orders and other domestic relations remedies.
1. See Catherine F. Klein and Leslye E. Orloff, ProvidingLegalPotectionforBattered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and CaseLaw, 21 HOFSrRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993). See also Margaret
Martin Barry, Protedive Order Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 62 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 339, 348,

n.31 (1995).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1001 to 16-1006 (1981 & Supp. 1996).

3. See infranote 31 and accompanying text. Hereinafter the author will discuss only CPOs,
but that term is meant to include both temporary and permanent protection orders.
4. In the District of Columbia, an intrafamily offense means:
an act punishable as a criminal offense committed by an offender upon a person:
(A) to whom the offender is related by blood, legal custody, marriage, having a
child in common, or with whom the offender shares or has shared a mutual residence; OR (B) with whom the offender maintains or maintained a romantic relationship not necessarily including a sexual relationship ....
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5) (1981 & Supp. 1996). See also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-101 - 223901 (1981 & Supp. 1996) for acts deemed criminal in the District of Columbia.
5. Pursuant to the District of Columbia Court Reform and Procedure Act, the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia is a court of general jurisdiction, thus it has jurisdiction over
all local matters. The Superior Court is arranged into separate, specialized divisions including
the Family Division, which has exclusive jurisdiction over matters of divorce, family support, custody, marriage, adoption, paternity, intrafamily offenses, delinquency, neglect, and commitment
of the mentally ill. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1101 (1981).
6. D.C. SUPER. Cr. INTRAFAMILY R. 11(b). This subsection provides for the issuance of a

CPO when the respondent has consented and the court is assured that the "respondent voluntarily consented" and "[tihe parties understand the contents of the order."
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common that even a form answer for respondents was suggested.7
The standard form would have instructed respondents to admit or
deny the allegations in the petition for a CPO and the court could
still enter an order indicating that the respondent had consented.'
Although the proposed form was not adopted, judges in the Superior Court handling these cases are split on whether admission of the
underlying offenses is required prior to entering a civil protection
order. This essay asserts that courts lack authority to enter a civil
protection order under such circumstances, and while the court's intent may be benign, the effect is that the integrity of protective orders is undermined in jurisdictions where such practices have developed.

7. See infra note 13 (discussing the Domestic Violence Plan).
8. D.C. SUPER. CT. INTRAFAMILYR. 11(b).
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I. THE COURT ENCOURAGES THE ENTRY OF CONSENT CIVIL
PROTECTION ORDERS

Significant strides have been made in this country in educating the
public and their institutions about the devastating and pervasive impact of domestic violence. 9 The courts, due in part to the efforts of
gender bias task forces10 and the National Council of Juvenile and

Family Court Judges," have been under pressure to take domestic
violence seriously and to intervene. 2 Many jurisdictions, including
the District of Columbia, have responded by implementing new approaches to handle domestic violence cases.' s However, there is still
9. SeeLynn Hecht Schafran, Update: GenderBiasin the Courts: DespiteProgres, ProblemsPemis,
TRIAL, 112,116 (July 1991).

10. For a discussion of gender basis task forces, se4 Judith Resnick, Now is the Wrong Time to
Stop Courts' Self-Study, AALS-WLE NEWSLETtER, 6 (1995); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Overwhelming
Evidence: Reportson GenderBias in the Courts,TRIAL, 28 (Feb. 1990); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Update:
GenderBias in the Courts.Despite Progress,ProbemsPersist, TRIAL, 112 (July 1991).

11. The National Council ofJuvenile and Family CourtJudges has issued a Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence and has been active promoting the judicial response to domestic
violence.
12. This intervention is contrary to earlier notions of domestic violence as a private matter
where legal interventions would only occur if certain boundaries were passed. For example,
behind the facade of fanily protection, English common law permitted and encouraged the
male's right to chastise his wife in order to enforce obedience. The "rule of thumb," as it was
called, allowed a husband to use any reasonable instrument to physically chastise his wife, provided the instrument was no thicker than his thumb. See, J. David Hirschel and Ira W.
Hutchison, HT Symposium on Domestic Violence: Studies: Female Spouse Abuse and the PoliceResponse:
The Charlotte,North CarolinaExperiment,83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 75-76 (1992).

13. In 1993, the First National Judicial Conference on Domestic Violence, sponsored by the
National Council on Juvenile and Family CourtJudges and the State Justice Institute, was held
in San Francisco, California. The District of Columbia sent a delegation, selected by then Chief
Judge of the Superior Court, Fred B. Ugast. As a result of the Conference, Judge Ugast formed
the District of Columbia Domestic Violence Coordinating Council, composed of representatives
from thejustice system agencies, community service agencies, law schools, and advocate organizations. The mission of the Council has been to develop and implement a coordinated response to domestic violence. In 1995, the District of Columbia Domestic Violence Plan was
adopted. It was viewed as the first stage of the Domestic Violence Coordinating Council's efforts. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COORDINATING COUNCIL, DisTIa
OF COLUMBIA: DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PLAN (1995). A major component of the plan is the restructuring of the way in which

the court handles domestic violence cases. Prior to the implementation of the plan in November, 1996, there was little coordination between the family and criminal divisions of the court
with regard to handling these cases. The result was conflicting orders, and poor service to those
seeking judicial relief. Under the plan, one calendar handles intrafamily cases, domestic relations cases in which violence is an issue, and criminal cases identified as based upon an intrafamily offense. All of these cases are sent to one master calendar that then dispenses contested
matters to one of two judges who are also specially assigned to the calendar. One of these
judges handles the criminal cases and the other judge handles the protective order cases.
Theoretically, the judge handling the protective order cases would handle domestic relations
cases involving intrafamily violence as well, but this has not been systematized as yet. A hearing
commissioner, who is also specially assigned to the calendar, hears intrafamily cases involving
paternity and support. The hearing commissioner also handles other protective order hearings
as needed, provided the parties consent. See, D.C. SUPER. Cr. GEN. FAM. R. D (describing the
duties of hearing commissioners). All three judges and the hearing commissioner sit on this
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much work to be done to educate judges and implement systems
that can effectively address the domestic violence problem. 4
The liberal entry of CPOs in the District of Columbia reflects the
impact of national awareness concerning domestic violence. Judges
have not been immune to the social science and media accounts describing the nature and impact of domestic violence. Their response
generally has been to err on the side of enjoining further abuse and
providing protective measures.15 The D.C. Court of Appeals has consistently ruled that the domestic violence statute is remedial and is to
be interpreted broadlyin favor of those who seek protection.'6
calendar for one year, as opposed to the monthly rotation for CPO cases in the past. Id. at 38. A
separate clerk's office has been established to handle domestic violence cases, and a Domestic
Violence Intake Center, located right next to the clerk's office and run by domestic violence
advocates, serves those who allege domestic abuse. Id. A tracking system will be employed that
will transfer all domestic violence cases, whether civil or criminal, to projectjudges. Id. at 40.
The judges and the clerks received training on specific issues related to domestic violence and
on how model jurisdictions have responded. It is too early say how well this system is working,
but it reflects a concerted effort to be more responsive to the growing demand for court intervention as a means of addressing domestic violence.
14. See Schafran, supra, note 9.
15. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (1981) delineates the remedies available if the Judge
finds that there is "good cause to believe the respondent has committed or is threatening an
intrafamily offense." The court may issue an order.
(1) directing the respondent to refirain from the conduct committed or threatened and to keep the peace toward the family member;,
(2) requiring the respondent, alone or in conjunction with any other member of
the family before the court, to participate in psychiatric or medical treatment or
appropriate counseling programs;
(3) directing, where appropriate, that the respondent avoid the presence of the
family member endangered;
(4) directing a respondent to refrain from entering or to vacate the dwelling of
the complainant when the dwelling is (A) marital property of the parties; or (B)
jointly owned, leased, or rented and occupied by both parties: Provided, thatjoint
occupancy shall not be required if a party is forced by the respondent to relinquish occupancy; or (C) owned, leased or rented by the complainant individually;
or (D) jointly owned, leased, or rented by the complainant and a person other
than the respondent;
(5) directing the respondent to relinquish possession or use of certain personal
property ownedjointly by the parties or by the complainant individually;
(6) awarding temporary custody of a minor child of the parties;
(7) providing for visitation rights with the appropriate restrictions to protect the
safety of the complainant;
(8) awarding costs and attorneys fees;
(9) ordering the Metropolitan Police Department to take such action as the Family Division deems necessary to enforce its orders;
(10) directing the respondent to perform or refrain from the other actions as may
be appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter;, or
(11) combining two or more of the directions or requirements prescribed by the
preceding paragraphs.
16. Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C. 1993) (dting Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597
A.2d 927, 930 (D.C. 1991)). The D.C. Court of Appeals stressed that the Intrafamily Offenses
Act is a "remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it
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Judges prefer not to have to make any decision in these cases, in
part because the cases can be difficult to determine, 7 and in part
because of the pressures of handling the heavy domestic violence
docket. Judges on the Superior Court Intrafamily Bench move these
cases quickly due to the potential risk to petitioners in Intrafamily
Offenses.' 8 Approximately forty CPO cases are scheduled each day,
and in addition to CPO petitions, this number includes motions for
contempt of CPOs and TPOs that were granted previously. 9 Contempt motions are more time consuming because they require appointment of counsel and, due to the higher standard of proof, ofThe court's docket cannot
ten result in lengthy hearings. 0
accommodate more than two to three contested hearings per day
and still be able to issue TPOs and CPOs in the expedited manner
required by the statute. 21 Thus, it is not surprising that consent orders are encouraged. A settlement negotiator is available,22 and the
parties are expected to meet with the negotiator in order to reach a
settlement. In the past, settlement negotiators along with many of
the judges who rotated through this calendar, made it clear that a
consent CPO could be entered where the respondent denied committing any crime or raised an exculpatory defense.

is intended to protect." Maldonado, 631 A.2d. at 42.
17. For example, many judges understand that domestic violence occurs behind dosed
doors, and must be prepared to assess carefully the credibility of petitioners who can only offer
their word that the incidents indeed occurred as represented.
18. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1004(d) (1981 & Supp. 1996) (providing that CPO hearings must
commence prior to the expiration of TPOs which only last 14 days). The goal is to avoid a delay
beyond three weeks in CPO cases in which a TPO is not entered, and as a rule, the CPO hearings are set within two to three weeks.
19. A recent amendment to the contempt statute makes a violation of a CPO punishable as
a misdemeanor with a penalty of up to a $1,000 fine or 180 days in jail. D.C. CODE ANN. § 161001 (5) (1981 & Supp. 1996). This has not led to a major shift of contempt prosecutions to the
criminal calendar. The Office of the U.S. Attorney, which handles most criminal prosecutions
in the District of Columbia, tends to prosecute violations of CPOs and TPOs based upon the
underlying crime. Furthermore, crimes that did not result in arrest generally are not prosecuted. As a result, many contempt orders are still prosecuted by the domestic violence survivor.
20. D.C. SUPER. Cr. INTRAFAMILYR1 12(c) (describing the contempt hearing procedures).
21. See D.C. CODE ANNOTATED § 16-1004(d) (1981 & Supp. 1996) (discussing that TPOs expire within 14 days and the CPO hearing must commence prior to expiration).
22. Prior to implementation of the court's Domestic Violence Plan, the court relied on a
settlement negotiator who initially was funded by grants obtained by the domestic violence advocacy community, and later through similar grants obtained by Georgetown University Law
School. Under the new structure, the negotiator, an attorney, is hired by the court through a
Violence Against Women Act grant.
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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S INTRAFAMILY OFFENSE

REQUIREMENT ISJURISDICTIONAL

A. TIE LAW
The Intrafamily Offenses Act states in pertinent part that, "[I]f, after a hearing, the Family Division finds that there is good cause to
believe that the respondent has committed or is threatening to
commit an intrafamily offense, it may issue a protective order ...
[directing certain enumerated remedies]. "2s D.C. Code § 16-1001
defines "intrafamily offense" as "an act punishable as a criminal offense," and goes on to describe the requisite familial or dating relationship. 24 Thus prior to entering a CPO, there must be some finding that the respondent committed one or more of the prohibited
acts.0 Unless there is such a finding, the court is without authority
to grant the requested order. 6
Two District of Columbia Court of Appeals cases that discuss subject matter jurisdiction, Sandoval v. Mendez27 and McKnight v. Scott,28
address it in the context of the requirement that the parties meet the
now obsolete statutory condition that an intimate relationship exist.2
Because the relationship aspect was at issue in these cases, it follows
that both the relationship and the offense are prerequisites to judicial action under the Intrafamily Offenses Act." In contested intrafamily cases, it is usually the offense, not the relationship that is at
issue.

23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (1981).
24. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5) (1981). The criminal offenses are enumerated at D.C.
CODEANN. §§ 22-101 et seq. (1981).
25. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (1981 & Supp. 1996) (stating that [i]f, after hearing...
there is good cause to believe respondent has committed ... an intrafamily offense, [then the
court] may issue a [civil] protection order").
26. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (1981 & Supp. 1996).

27. Sandoval v. Mendez, 521 A.2d 1168, 1169 (D.C. 1987) (holding that without the requisite intimate relationship in addition to sharing a residence, the court is withoutjurisdiction to
act under the Intrafamily Offenses Act). A subsequent amendment to the Act has removed this
particularjurisdictional prerequisite. D.C. CODEANN. § 16-1001(5) (1981 & Supp. 1996).
28. McKnight v. Scott, 665 A.2d 973, 975 (D.C. 1995) (holding that the Court does have
subject matter jurisdiction where the intimate relationship requirement is met. In this case, the
court found in addition to living together, the couple was engaged to be married.). A subsequent amendment to this act has removed thisjurisdictional prerequisite. D.C. CODE ANN. § 161001(5) (1981 & Supp. 1996).
29. The DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIP Acr OF 1994, D.C. Law 10-237,
effective March 21, 1995, codifted at D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 and 16-1003 (1981 & Supp.
1996) eliminated the intimacy requirement.
80. SeeD.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (1981 & Supp. 1996).
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B. THE RULE

Rule 11(b) of the Intrafamily Branch of the Superior Court addresses CPOs consented to by the respondent.3 ' The rule does not
specify that by consenting to the entry of the order the respondent
admits to the allegations made.32 In fact, in Maldonado v. Maldonado, the Court of Appeals observed that "the purpose of the
statute is served by encouraging respondents' consent to these
agreements." 3 While extension of a CPO can be based on consideration of intrafamily offenses that supported the initial order,s the
Court of Appeals made no mention of relating back to the initial offense. While it did state that the consent must "not be unlawful, unreasonable, or inequitable," it gave no indication that lack of a finding, through admission or adjudication, that an intrafamily offense
occurred would hamper its conclusion
that consent agreements
5
CPO.
a
of
entry
the
in
result
should
Furthermore, subsection (d) of Rule 11 gives additional support to
the conclusion that intrafamily offenses are not linked to the authority to grant the protective order remedies. Rule 11(d) specifically
provides for a jurisdictional waiver in entering mutual protective orders, with no apparent requirement that an intrafamily offense by
the petitioner be alleged, much less admitted 6 As a general proposition, entering mutual orders undercuts the goal of protecting the
domestic violence survivor by making it unclear who is in need of
31. D.C. SUPER. Cr. INTRAFAMILYR. 11(b) states as follows:
(b) CONSENT ORDER. When the respondent has consented to having a Civil Protection Order issued, the Court shall make sufficient inquiry to be assured that:
(1) the respondent voluntarily consented to the issuance of the Civil Protection Order; and
(2) the parties understand the contents of the Order.
32. SeeD.C. SUPER. Cr. INTRAFAMILYR. 11(b).
33. MIaldonado, 631 A.2d at 44.
34. See Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d at 930,932 (finding that respondent's past conduct is
important evidence in predicting probable future conduct, and instructing the lower court to
take into consideration the "entire mosaic" in assessing whether to extend appellant's CPO).
35. Maldonado, 631 A.2d at 44.

36. The Court generally requires the filing of a Petition and Affidavit to permit the entry of
a CPO, but does provide an exception for. "[i]ssuance of [sic] order against both parties." It

states that:
"the individual who ... after having been apprised by the Court of his or her rights
with respect to the filing of a Petition and Affidavit and to a hearing on such Petition, understandingly consents to the issuance of an Order binding him or her,
provided, however, that the Court may, as a condition of the issuance of a Civil
Protection Order in favor of any party to abide by such fair and reasonable conditions as may be necessary and appropriate to ensure fairness and facilitate compliance with the Civil Protection Order."
D.C. SUPER. CT. INTRAFAMLYR. 11(d).
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protection. 7 Such practices have specifically been discouraged by
the Violence Against Women ActY8 Similarly, mutual orders obscure
the goals of the Intrafamily Offenses Act, which the D.C. Court of
Appeals has consistently described as remedial." Significantly, Rule
11(d) suggests that waiver of the allegation that an intrafamily offense was committed is an acceptable basis for entry of a CPO."Thus,
a petitioner can be equally bound by a CPO in the absence of any
claim of wrongdoing simply by agreeing to its terms.4'
Rule 11(d) is explicit that a party has the right to notice in the
form of service of a petition and affidavit alleging the requisite relationship and offense.4 It is equally explicit that this notice can be
vaived.Y Under the rule, once this notice is waived, the court can
enter a CPO. While notice can certainly be waived, 44 it is far less clear
that waiver legitimizes the court's authority to enter a CPO in the absence of any finding of criminal activity on the part of the person
bound by the order.4
One might be tempted to read Rule 11(d) as contemplating no
more than an ancillary order to the petitioner that helps to effect
the relief granted under the CPO. For example, a CPO that enjoins
the respondent from harming or contacting the petitioner may also
grant the petitioner custody of the parties' children with visitation
rights to the respondent.4 The petitioner would be obligated by the
37. See Joan Zorza, Using the Law to Protect Battered Women and Ther Children, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 1437, 144344 (Apr. 1994) (advocating victims should avoid consenting
to mutual orders because they greatly increase the danger to the victim and her children and
serve to confuse rather than guide a police officer in responding to domestic violence, making
enforcement difficult).
38. For example, the VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AcT presumptively orders that full faith
and credit be granted to protection orders issued by a court, after reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard is given to the person against whom the order is sought. The Act does not
permit full faith and credit to be given to cross or counter petitions issued against one who has
filed a petition for a protection order if no counter petition was filed, or if one had been filed
and the court failed to make specific findings that each party qualified for an order. This suggests Congress' distaste for mutual protection orders. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1994,
18 U.S.C.A. § 2265(c) (West Supp. 1994).
39. See Madonado,631 A.2d at 42.
40. Waiver of notice is permissible under FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (1).
41. D.C. SUPER. CT. INTRAFAtIILyR. 11(d).
42. D.C. SUPER. Cr. INTRAFAMILYR. 11.
43. D.C. SUPER. CT. INTRAFAMILYR. 11.
44. D.C. SUPER. CT. INTRAFAMILYR. 11.
45. D.C. SUPER. CT. INTRAFAMILYR. 11(d).
46. The law was recently amended to protect victims of domestic violence and their children from the contact required through visitation orders. The court must justify in writing a
grant of custody or visitation to an abusive parent, and a respondent seeking visitation must
prove that such contact will not harm the abused parent or the child. D.C. CODE ANN. § 161005(c-1). See also, D.C. CODEANN. §§ 16-911(a-1) and 16-914(a-1).
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order to make the child available at the appointed time. Part of the
comment to Rule 11 would support the conclusion that an ancillary
order should be the extent to which a petitioner is bound in that it
states that "[t]he terms of any order against a respondent may require certain conduct and cooperation by the petitioner or members
of the petitioner's family." 47 This would not amount to entry of a
CPO against the petitioner, although failure to comply with aspects
of the orders have been viewed by judges as subject to the CPO contempt sanctions.4 However, the intent to bind the petitioner in
more than an ancillary manner is apparent since the comment goes
on to state that:
In those situations in which the Court determines that full relief under this rule cannot reasonably be afforded without requiring more substantial conduct by the petitioner, the petitioner may be permitted to consent to issuance of an order
against both parties.49

This part of the comment underscores the language in the rule
that allows for both parties to be mutually bound by a CPO, provided
the petitioner is also willing to consent.
Nonetheless, the opprobrium with which mutual orders have been
met has reduced them to a rarity in the District of Columbia. 0
Nonetheless, Rule 11 is in conflict with the law both in terms of its
reference to mutual orders and to consent orders in general.
III. SUBJECT MATTERJURISDIcTION IS NOT WAIVABLE

It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that subject matter jurisdiction
is "at the top of the hierarchy" with regard to limitations on the
court's authority to act.5' It cannot be created by parties to a lawsuit,
and it cannot be waived. 2 The District of Columbia law is firm on
this point. Accordingly, "'neither silence nor consent of the parties
47. Comment, D.C. SUPER. CT. INTRAFAMILYR. 11.
48. While I am not aware of a petitioner actually being held in contempt for failing to
comply with visitation orders, I have on many occasions had judges threaten my clients, with
such a penalty, as a matter of course in granting CPOs.
49. See infra note 53.
50. See supra note 38 (discussing the Violence Against Women Act); and Zorza supra note
37 (discussing the negative impact of mutual orders upon the victims of domestic abuse).
51. Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata! Toward a RationalSystem of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Case , 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422, 427 n.29 (1991) (quotingAllan Stein, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Ace=ssDoctrine,133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 786-787 (1985)).
52. F.R. CIV.P. 12(h) (3) and 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHTAND ARTHURRi MILLER, FEDERAL
PRAMrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1393 (waiver of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be done by consent of the parties). See also, Lederman supra note 49 (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335,
342-43 (1960)).
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can confer jurisdiction. ' ""' Additionally, the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal or sua sponte by
the court.H The rule is so strong, that even if a party strategically or
deliberately failed during trial to raise the issue of the court's competency to hear the dispute, the court will still reject the case if it is de-

termined that subject matterjurisdiction is lacking at any stage of the
case.m
Absolutes, however, are difficult to sustain. For example, the D.C.
Court of Appeals has described jurisdiction as an "elusive and uncertain characterization depending on the environment in which it is
employed."" The Court has taken some pains to draw distinctions
between "classic subject matter jurisdiction," the kind that concerns
the competence of a court to adjudicate a particular kind of controversy, 57 and "territorial jurisdiction," which combines certain aspects
of subject matter jurisdiction with those of in personamjurisdiction,
and which relates jurisdiction over subject matter to a certain
"geographical relationship to a particular 'thing' or 'status. '"m Classic
subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable, whereas territorial jurisdiction is.59 Using territorial jurisdiction, the court in B.J.P. resolved
the inherently awkward results that can flow from the jurisdictional
mandates of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 60 and
53. McCray v. McGee, 504 A.2d 1128, 1131 (D.C. 1986) (quoting 1425 F Street Corp. v. Jardin, 53 A.2d 278, 279 (D.C. 1947)).
54. "[Wlhen it affirmatively appears that [subject matter] jurisdiction is lacking, an objection may be raised by the parties or by the court for the first time on appeal." BJ.P. v. R.W.P.,
637 A.2d 74, 78 (D.C. 1994) (citing King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656 (D.C. 1993)). "The District of
Columbia adheres to the traditional rule that a party's acquiescence in the trial court's exercise
of subject matter jurisdiction (or a waiver of a defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction),
indicated by the failure to raise the defense before or during the trial, does not preclude that
party from raising the issue on appeal." King; 640 A.2d at 652 (citations omitted). "[W]here a
substantial question exists as to this court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is our obligation to
raise it, sua sponte even though no party has asked us to consider it." Murphy v. McCloud, 650
A.2d 202, 203 n.4 (D.C. 1994) (citations omitted).
55. "[A] question of subject matterjurisdiction may be presented by any interested party at
any time ...[even] for the first time on appeal .... If ...
jurisdiction is not apparent, the Court
not only will, but must, refuse to proceed with the determination of the merits of the controversy, unless this filure can be cured. This is true regardless of what stage the case may be in,
and whether the defect is called to the Court's attention by suggestion of the parties or otherwise." King, 640 A.2d at 662 n.4 (quoting 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1393, 766-73 (1990)).
56. B.J.P., 637 A.2d at 78 (quoting Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir.
1952)).
57. "[The one commonly meant when referring to 'subject matterjurisdiction'-concerns
[sic] the 'competence' of the court to adjudicate a particular kind of controversy; e.g., divorce
or child custody." Id. at 80 (Ferren,J., concurring).
58. Id. at 80-81(Ferren, J., concurring) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11
cmt. b (1982)).
59. Id. at 81 (FerrenJ. concurring) (citations omitted).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991)
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the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 1 which have
been adopted by the District of Columbia and the states.
In BJ.P., the court denied a mother's claim on appeal that the
District of Columbia lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
the custody of her children because the District was not the "home
state" of either child.6 ' This objection was raised by the mother for
the first time on appeal6s The court, in denying her claim, observed
that "[u]ncritical application of the 'no waiver of subject matter jurisdiction' rule to the sort of situation presented in the case would
permit a litigant to contest the merits of a controversy in a convenient forum, exult in victory if she wins, but keep the jurisdictional
card in her hip pocket, to be produced only in the event that she
loses. " 6 Which is precisely what issues of subject matter jurisdiction
allow litigants to do, since a party cannot confer jurisdiction by failing to raise it." According to the court, the issue in B.J.P. was really
one of territorialjurisdiction, and thus the hard rule did not apply.66
This territorial jurisdiction, as a geographically driven subset of the
court's general authority to hear custody cases, does not impact the
power of the court to adjudicate a particular type of controversy, 67
and thus it can be waived.6a
The Intrafamily Offenses Act does not trigger the hybrid of geographical and subject matter jurisdictional issues raised by the statutory guidelines for asserting jurisdiction in a custody case.69 The
statutory guideline in this instance is that authority exists to enter a
specific creation, the CPO, if a criminal act was perpetrated and the
requisite relationship7 exists.7" That suggests a classic limitation on
the court's authority. 1
61. D.C. CODEANN. § 16-4501 etseq. (1981 & Supp. 1996).
62. B.J.P., 637 A.2d at 79 (finding that "the mother waived any territorial limitation of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction").
at 77-78.
63. Id.
64. Idat 79 (citingPalmerConstr. Co. v. Patouillet, 42 A.2d 273, 274 (D.C. 1945)).
65. King; 640 A.2d at 662 n.4.
66. B.J.P., 637 A.2d at 78 (finding the court had not lacked subject matter jurisdiction that
would result in dismissal).
67. "'Once a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction to consider the general dass or
kind of case, its specific jurisdiction over a particular case within the general class is subject to
waiver.'" B.J.P., 637 A.2d at 79 (quotingWflliams v. Williams, 555 N.E.2d 142, 144 (Ind.1990)).
68. BJ.P., 637 A.2d at 81 (Ferren, J., concurring) (citing Williams, 555 N.E.2d at 144
(finding any challenge to territoriaijurisdiction "must be raised at the outset of the action")).
69. See D.C. CODEANN. §§16-1001 to 16-1006 (1981 &Supp. 1996).
70. So D.C. CODEANN. §16-1005 (1981 & Supp. 1996).
71. "A court by its own words cannot create or extinguish its own subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the source ofjurisdiction is 'the constitutional and statutory provisions by which it
is created.'" Appeal of A.H., 590 A.2d 123, 129 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Demar v. Open Space &
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Still, the D.C. Court of Appeals has made clear its intent to support the spirit of protection for victims of domestic violence reflected
in the Intrafamily Offenses Act. In Cruz-Foster v. Foster, it held that
the Intrafamily Offenses Act "must be liberally construed in furtherance of its remedial purpose"n and that it is necessary to consider
whether the "balance of harms" favors granting the requested relief."'
The court went on to describe the potential harm to Ms. Cruz of refusing to protect her from assaults and threat of assaults as substantial. On the other hand, the potential harm to Mr. Foster of requiring him "to do no more than obey the law and ...stay away from Ms.
Cruz," was deemed relatively minor.74 The issue in Cruz-Fosterwas
not whether an intrafamily offense had occurred, but whether there
was sufficient basis for extending the original order. The court
found that the past history is critical to petitioners' meeting the good
cause standard for extending a civil protection order. 7"
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONTORTING THE INTRAFAMILY STATUTE

Despite the statutory limitation on entry of CPOs, D.C. Superior
Court judges have authority, under the equitable powers of the
court, to enter protective orders absent a relationship or criminal offense.76 The court's equitable powers allow it to enter orders granting remedies similar to those available under the Intrafamily Offenses Act to persons who consent to such action. While the specific
remedies granted could be the same, the enforcement would be77
based upon the general contempt sanctions available to judges.
The criminal contempt sanctions that are available for violation of
the intrafamily order would not apply to orders entered under the
court's general equitable powers.7 The court has the authority to
Conservation Comm'n, 559 A.2d 1103, 1107-08 (Conn. 1989)).
72. Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d at 929.
73. Id at 930.
74. Id.

75. Id at 930-32. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(d) and D.C. SUPER. Cr. INTRAFAMILY R.
11(f) (providing that an intrafamily order can be extended for good cause shown).
76. See e.g., Felder v. Allsopp, 391 A.2d 243 reh'g denied (D.C. 1978) (holding that while not
specified in D.C. CODE ANN.§ 11-1101 (1981), a judge assigned to the Family Division of the
Superior Court has authority to hear a complaint for visitation).
77. D.C. CODEANN.§ 16-944 (1981 & Supp. 1996).
78. The Intrafamily Offenses Act provides that the violation of a ITO (referred to in the
statute as "temporary" because of its fourteen day duration) or CPO (referred to in the statute
as "permanent" because of its one year duration) "shall be punishable as contempt." D.C. CODE
ANN.§ 16-1005(0 (1981). It is the Superior Court Intrafamily Rules that provide that the punishment may be a fine of not more than $300.00 or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both. D.C. SUPER. Cr. INTRAFAMILYR. 12(e). The statute was recently amended to
provide that violation of a temporary or permanent protection order is chargeable as a misde-
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impose criminal sanctions for contempt, and unlike the CPO con-

tempt sanction, there is no specific limit on the length of sentence

an offender would face for having violated such an order.s°
The broad power available to the court under D.C. Code Ann. §11-

944, could provide ample protection for a person claiming domestic
abuse who is seeking to obtain an order by consent against an alleged abuser who denies the underlying offense.8 ' The problem is
that equitable injunctions have not been the normative response

among judges to domestic violence cases.

The statutory scheme

adopted throughout the country attests to the fact that an alternative

to existing equitable authority was deemed necessaryss Furthermore, law enforcement systems are set up to respond to cases specifically identified as having protective orders." For example, in the
District of Columbia, CPOs are recorded in the Metropolitan Police
Departments computers, and thus police coming to the scene of a

dispute should be aware that such orders exist, which should in turn

inform their understanding of the situation.8 4 Also, under the Vio-s

lines,
lence Against Women Act, CPOs are enforceable across state
and under the Gun Control Act, possession of a gun by the person
subject to a restraining order is prohibited during the term of the
order.t ' The force of the protections contemplated by these laws,
however, should be backed by a finding or an admission of abusive

activity. If all that is forthcoming is a willingness to be bound by the
meanor and "upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 180 days, or both." D.C. CODE ANN. §16-1005(g) (Supp. 1996). While
this new subsection provides the only statutory reference to a penalty for contempt of a protection order, the language does not address the extent of any penalty that is not the result of a
misdemeanor charge. Contempt actions still fall under subsection (f) and follow the remedy
available under Intrafamily Rule 12(e). Both the misdemeanor and contempt remedies for violation of a protective order are tied to the intrafanily statute. They do not confer a contempt
power that would reach protection orders entered outside of the scope of the statute.
79. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-944 (1981). The elements of criminal contempt are (1) willful
disobedience (2) of a court order and (3) causing an obstruction of the orderly administration
ofjustice. In re Thompson, 454 A. 2d 1324 (D.C. App. 1982).
80. While there is no limit on the length of a sentence for criminal contempt, this does not
mean that the proportionality principal does not apply; the sentence must bear a reasonable
relationship to the underlying conduct. Caldwell v. United States, 595 A.2d 961 (D.C. App.
1991).
81. SeeD.C. CODEANN. § 11-944(b) (1981).
82. See eg. D.C. CODE ANN. §16-1001 - 16-1006 (1981 & Supp. 1996).
83. See, eg., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (8) (1981). The judge issuing CPOs can order
"the Metropolitan Police Department to take such action as the Family Division deems necessary
to enforce its orders." Id. As a matter of course, all intrafamily orders are entered into the police computer system.
84. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031.
85. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2265(c) (West Supp. 1994).
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (West 1997).
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court order, then the scheme desinged to address domestic violence
embodied in the Intrafamily Offenses Act should yield to a less specific standard.87

V. VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARE NOT SERVED BY CASUAL

APPLICATION OF THE LAW

Significant strides have been made in this country in educating the
public and its institutions about the devastating and pervasive impact
of domestic violence's The tremendous effort over the past few decades to generate remedies for domestic violence has resulted in increased societal interest in protecting survivors of domestic violence.ta The District of Columbia is one of many jurisdictions that
87. One could also argue that consent CPOs accompanied by a denial of the intrafamily
offense charged are comparable to the acceptance of Aford pleas in criminal cases. A guilty
plea in a criminal case requires the defendant to admit guilt, unless it is entered pursuant to the
doctrine in North Carolinav. Afford, which allows a defendant to plead guilty while still maintaining innocence. North Carolinav. Aford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The Court found that an express
admission of guilt is "not a constitutional requisite to imposition of a criminal penalty," and an
"individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in
the acts constituting the crime." Id at 37. See also, D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 11(b)
(authorizing a plea of noo contendre).) The basic rationale for supporting entry of the Aford
plea is that defendants should be able to avoid the risk of conviction of more serious charges by
pleading guilty to a lesser charge, even if the defendant claims innocence or, for some reason,
cannot admit guilt. Id. That this allows courts to move their criminal dockets more quickly is an
added benefit.
Setting aside arguments for and against such pleas in a criminal context, the lack of an admission or finding of abusive action in entering civil protective orders undermines the very basis for
this injunctive action. The Intrafamily Offenses Act is on firmer ground if protective orders are
entered as a result of a finding or admission of abusive behavior. Injunctions are deemed extraordinary relief, justified by the irreparable harm that can result from failure to grant the requested intervention. See Wieck v. Sterenbuch, 350 A.2d 384 (D.C. 1976) (in order to obtain a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate
that: (1) there is a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the action; (2) irreparable harm will result to the moving party during the pendency of the action; (3) more harm will
result to the moving party by denial of the TRO than to the adverse party from its grant; and
(4) the public interest will not be disserved by granting the order.). Danger ofirreparable harm
is the most important of these elements. Id at 387. Questions as to the existence of the underlying danger should not be glossed over in an effort to err on the side of granting protection or
of simply moving a crowded docket.
88. SeeSchafran supra note 9.
89. Civil remedies were first created for D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§16-1001 - 16-1006 (1981 & Supp. 1996)). The very existence of civil protection orders throughout the country is due in part to the insipid response
from the criminal justice system to this brand of crime. Civil injunctions that create an opportunity for private prosecution for future infractions do not exist simply because they can provide
more flexibility with regard to tailoring relief for the victimized family. They exist because of
the woeful lack of response to crimes against intimates. See Barry, supra note 1, at 340, "[t] he
sluggish criminaljustice response to domestic violence led women's groups in the early 1970s to
seek legislative alternatives to state prosecution and to obtain structural reform of state law enforcement efforts through statutory requirements and conforming policy changes. The approach by women's groups has been three-pronged: to gain better police intervention, to in-
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have implemented new procedures to effectively respond to the
needs of those seeking protection from domestic violence. 90 These
procedures hinge on the vast majority of cases that are resolved by
consent agreement.9' As indicated above, the court which needs to
accommodate approximately forty family law cases per day cannot
hold more than a few brief hearings at best." Settlement is therefore
essential, and given the nature of the harm the court is designed to
address, the desire to err on the side of enjoining future harm often
sets a tone that encourages respondents to consent to protective orders.95 The result can be that the rights and liberty of the accused
are restricted despite a firm denial of the underlying offenses. 94 The
desire to protect victims of domestic violence, however, is hampered
if the respondent defends enforcement of the CPO by arguing that
the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the mutual order since consent
was not based on the requisite finding that an intrafamily offense occurred.95
Furthermore, while there is merit in the sentiment that it is better
to err on the side of entering a protective order in the litigated context, there are several flaws in that perspective. First of all, a disturbing trend is occurring in the D.C. Superior Court. Batterers rush to
the courthouse to file their own petition for a CPO and, in some instances, they seek and obtain preliminary two-week TPOs that are
granted ex parte if the petitioner can convince the court that exigent
crease criminal prosecution, and to utilize civil orders of protection."(dting The Effect of Woman
Abuse on Children, NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILYI AW 86 (1991)).
90. "All 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have civil protection order provisions." See Barry, supranote 1, at 348, n.31(citingKein, supranote 1, at 810).
91. See supra note 31 (discussing D.C. SUPER. CT. INTRAFAMILY1. 11).
92. See supra Part II (discussing the D.C. Superior Court Intrafaminly Bench).
93. See Catherine F. Klein and Leslie Orloff, Representing a Victim of Domestic Violence, 17

FAMILY ADVOCATE 25, 28 (1995) (discussing the dangers of mutual civil protective orders and
why judges issue mutual CPOs).
94. Superior Court judges have the authority to grant the following relief to a victim of
domestic violence: (1) prohibitory injunction directing the abuser to refrain molesting, assaulting, or threatening the victim; (2) requiring the abuser to submit to psychiatric or medical
treatment or counseling programs (e.g., Domestic Violence Intervention Program); (3) directing
the abuser to stay away from the victim; (4) ordering the abuser to vacate the residence of the
abused, if the residence is jointly owned or rented by both parties, or personally owned or
rented by the victim and some other individual; (5) directing the abuser to give up rights to certain property;, (6) awarding custody of minor children; (7) determining visitation rights of the
abuser (court has the authority to determine if visitation should be supervised); (8) awarding
costs and attorney's fees; (9) obtaining assistance from the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department in carrying out the provisions of the CPO. This includes having a police officer present
when dividing property, etc. (10) any other relief the court deems necessary. D.C. CODE ANN.

§ 16-1005(c) (1981).
95. SeeD.C. CODEANN. § 16-1005(c) and (j). See also, D.C. SUPERCT. INTRAFAMILYR. 11(e)
and P. 12 (discussing contempt) To date, the author knows of no cases in D.C. where ajurisdic-

tional defense has been raised.
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circumstances exist.9s The TPO is readily granted, with judges often
taking very little oral testimony or granting the TPO based purely on
reviewing the petition. The remedies under the TPO are the same
as those available under the one-year CPO.98 The result can be that
not only is the batterer physically and emotionally abusing the victim, but that the court is complicit in these actions. The victim faces
a machine tuned to issue orders of protection, and at times resistant
to the facts asserted by the respondent/victim. The perpetrator of
the violence gains the court's contempt power as another element of
the abuse arsenal. Nor would seeking a mutual order in response to
such a tactic be beneficial. A domestic violence survivor who seeks a
mutual protection order in response to such a tactic does little more
than reduce its impact. Even if the victim could overcome the procedural hurdles, the value of the mutual order is minimal in that
nothing is conveyed as to fault. 9 Police and the courts have little insight into who is at risk under mutual orders.0n
Secondly, judges who enter, or who know GPOs are entered under
lax procedural circumstances, are reluctant to credit them as indicative of a past history of violence. 11 One example of the impact of
96. D.C. CODEANN. § 16-1004(d) (1981 & Supp. 1996).
97. The court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that there is good cause to
issue a CPO. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(c) (1981 & Supp. 1996); D.C. SUPER Cr. INTRAFAMiLY
R- 11(c). The District of Columbia Superior Court's Domestic Violence Implementation Plan
anticipates that petitioners seeking Temporary Protection Orders will submit pleadings only,
and that oral testimony will be taken only at the request of the judge. Thus, the practice of doing little to assess the credibility of the unopposed litigant will be firmly built into the court
process. This approach would be consistent with D.C. SUPER. cr. INTRAFAMILY R. 7(a) (1)-(2)
(permitting a petitioner to request a TPO by motion and enabling the court to determine from
testimony or the petition whether a family member is in immediate danger). See generally, Kin
Kinports and Karla Fischer, OrdersofProtectionin Domestic Violence Cases: An EmpiricalAssessment of
the Impact of the Reform Statutes. 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 163, 166 (1993) (discussing how TPOs
are often exparteinnature and require no prior notice to respondent upon showing that if the
respondent is notified, the petitioner will be subject to abuse). See also New State and FederalResponses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528 (1993).

98. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(d) (1981) (granting the court the authority to issue TPOs
where it finds "the safety or welfare of a family member is immediately endangered by the respondent"). TPOs may include any of the remedies authorized under the one year CPO statute. D.C. SUPER. Cr. INTRAFAMILYR. 7(a) (2) (discussing contempt procedures for TPOs).
99. See Zorza, supra note 37, at 1443-44; Klein, supra note 93, at 28 (explaining that the
presumption of a mutual order is "that both a petitioner and a respondent are equally at fault").
100. See Zorza, supra note 37, at 1443-44; Klein, supra note 85, at 28 (explaining the
"ambiguity rewards batterers, who can wrongly accuse the victim of being the instigator or perpetrator of the violence, and endangers the victim, who may be falsely arrested and left unprotected against future assaults by the abuser").
101. See Klein, supra note 93, at 28-29 (advising lawyers of domestic abuse victims to "[a]sk
the judge to specify the incidents on which [the denial or issuance of the civil protective order]
is based" and "[m]ake sure that the court makes these statements on the record," and warning
these lawyers that"[w]ritten findings and conclusions are crucial to enforcement and will provide critical information to judges ruling on other cases between the same parties, including
divorce actions, child abuse charges, or criminal prosecutions").
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this approach is that the abused parent may find it difficult to demonstrate that a history of violence should preclude an award of custody or visitation. 1 2 In Prostv. Green,05 a series of TPOs were entered
by consent against the respondent who was subsequently granted
custody of the minor children."l Respondent nonetheless firmly det
The Court of Appeals remanded the
nied all allegations of abuse.r'
case finding that it was "unresolved whether all or any of the acts occurred." "0 If fault was unresolved, then the TPOs should never have
been entered. Conversely, if TPOs were entered, it should follow
that at least one of the alleged criminal acts occurred.107 The weight
given to the issuance of TPOs and CPOs will also affect their value in
tort and contract actions.10 8
Thirdly, for respondents who in fact did not transgress, being propelled into consenting to a CPO can be a blow from a system that
they feel powerless to entreat. This is destructive, particularly in the
black community, where the judicial system has been viewed as short
on justice throughout the history of this country.' °9 Most of the parties moving through the D.C. Superior Court's Intrafamily calendar
are black, ° and while the battle is largely personal, it does not help
for either the petitioner or the respondent to experience the court's
disinterest in the merits. This breeds anger, frustration and cynicism.
Conversely, there is a considerable incentive to encourage consents in these matters as a means of protecting victims. Domestic
102. A history of domestic violence is relevant to custody and visitation awards under recent

amendments to the District of Columbia intrafamily and divorce statutes. D.C. CODE ANN. § 161005(c-1) (Supp. 1996) (codifying Joint Custody of Children Act of 1996, D.C. LAW 11-112
(1996)). Some argue that domestic violence is used to gain the upper hand in custody cases.
Such claims would be harder to assert where CPOs are used as evidence of the violence, provided such orders are the result of a trial or an admission of violent actions. The statute refers
to a history of violence, and thus the entry of one CPO may still not provide the requisite proof
of domestic violence.
103. Prost v. Green, 652 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1995).
104. Id. at631.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (discussing that the court's acceptance of consent to TPOs leaves the issue of
whether intrafhmily violence occurred unresolved).
108. See Klein, supra note 1, at 995 n.1235(citing JACQUELINE A. AGTUCA, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN CIVIL COURT CASES: A NATIONAL MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EDUCATION 293-327

(1992)); see also New State and FederalResponses to Domestic Volene, supra note 97, at 1549.
109. See generally Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersecionof Injustice: Experiences of African American
Women in Cime and Sentencing 4 AM. U.J. GENDER & LAW 1 (1995).

110. In 1989, 80.4% of petitioners for CPOs were African-American. D.C. COURTS: FINAL
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS, 143 (May 1992).
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violence survivors are often traumatized by the prospect of facing
their abusers at trial, and thus may be effectively precluded from getting a protective order absent a consent. One of my clients, for example, was so terrorized by her abuser that she was afraid to step out
of her house to come to my office to prepare the protective order
petition."' When we finally went to court, it was only on the condition that we could get a consent from a respondent who had broken
down her door twice, beaten her up once, and generally terrorized
her and her twelve year old daughter. Another client who happened
to suffer from epilepsy was so afraid of going to trial that just before
the CPO hearing she became increasingly certain that she would
have a seizure."2 I spent a good part of the time that we waited for
her case to be called with my legal pad folded and ready so that she
would be able to bite down on it if necessary. This intolerable situation ultimately led us to the court nurse, and resulted in a consent
order without one of the remedies sought by my client.
Thus, seeking to extract more than noncommittal consent may effectively cut victims off from a much needed intervention. On balance, however, seeking alternative forms of equitable relief for victims who are not prepared emotionally to prove their case is
preferable to undermining the intrafamily system and the contingent remedies that protective order violations may support. If instead of routinely issuing intrafamily consent orders equitable relief
by consent was granted in those cases where the respondent denied
culpability, the culture of the court may evolve to a routine of accommodating these equitable orders.

111. The facts in the cases have been adjusted slightly to protect client confidentiality.
112. The facts in the cases have been adjusted slightly to protect client confidentiality.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Civil protection orders provide an important set of remedies to
survivors of domestic violence. These orders are at once broader
than criminal prosecution and more forgiving. They offer injunctive
relief from violence, distance, interim resolution of custody, support,
and property issues. Judges focusing particularly on the relief from
violence are inclined to grant the desired remedies under most circumstances, and particularly when presented with orders to which
the accused has consented. This is problematic where the accused
has denied, or failed to admit to the underlying offense, since
committing a prohibited offense is a prerequisite to judicial action.
If the accused has committed a criminal offense, fault should be established. When a wrong has been perpetrated, a remedy is both just
and warranted. If the offense is denied, denial should be made clear
and the court should structure its course of action accordingly.
Absent an admission of guilt and in the context of avoiding litigation, it may be appropriate under the general equitable jurisdiction
of the court to enter an injunction against violence by consent, and
to grant other broad remedies similar to those available under a
CPO. Such action should not be confused with the issuance of a
CPO, since the procedural context and enforcement are different."1mt should also be clear that such an order will not be included
in the system designed to combat domestic violence since it is not
based on a finding or admission of a criminal offense in the context
of an intrafamily relationship.
There is tension between making important protective order
remedies available to the many survivors of domestic violence who
desperately need help and following the statutory requirement that
an intrafamily offense be established. More cases will be tried due to
failed negotiations where the accused, while willing to agree to entry
of an order, will not admit to wrongdoing."' In fact, this is already
beginning to happen as a result of one judge's demand for admis113. Chapter 16 of D.C. CODE ANNOTATED outlines the power of the court with intrafamily
causes of action. Sections 16-1001 to 16-1006 outline the power of the court to peacefully resolve intrafamily offenses. The D.C. Family Division Court has equitable powers to enjoin parties in divorce and custody cases without triggering the remedies available under the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act (codified at D.C. CODEANN. §§16-1001 to 16-1006 (1981 & Supp. 1996)).
114. Batterers counseling programs focus on the batterers accepting responsibility for their
wrongdoing. Naomi Cahn and Joan Meier, Domestic Triolence and FeministJurisprudence:Toward a
New Agenda, 1 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 339, 347-48 (1995). Such counseling is routinely ordered in
the Intrafhmily Branch of the D.C. Superior Court. The respondents are sent to the Domestic
Violence Intervention Program, which is part of the court's probation division. The program
struggles to accommodate the ever increasing number of referrals.
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sion of guilt in consent agreements. Solutions that require more judicial resources are not palatable to courts that are pressed by high
caseloads and tight budgets. Nonetheless, accommodations can be
made. Cases that are contested could, for example, be sent to judges
whose dockets have cleared, or if absolutely necessary, cases could be
rescheduled. An admission of guilt or a hearing on the merits and
findings of fact by the judge are preferable to undermining this important intervention, both in terms of the integrity of the orders
within the judicial system and the respect they command in the
community at large.

